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Abstract
The paper proposes a novel method for conducting policy analysis with potentially
misspeci¯ed dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models and applies it
to a New Keynesian DSGE model along the lines of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (JPE 2005) and Smets and Wouters (JEEA 2003). We ¯rst quantify the degree
of model misspeci¯cation and then illustrate its implications for the performance of
di®erent interest-rate feedback rules. We ¯nd that many of the prescriptions derived
from the DSGE model are robust to model misspeci¯cation.
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1 Introduction
The quantitative evaluation of monetary policy rules plays an important role in the design
of stabilization policies. Much of the recent debate about optimal monetary policy rules
has been carried out with New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models (see Woodford 2003). DSGE models have the advantage that one can explicitly assess
the e®ect of policy regime changes on expectation formation and decision rules of private
agents. Yet, until recently, these models were scarcely used by central banks because they
were perceived as being inferior to less structural model in terms of ¯t. Recent work by
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003) has changed this
perception. These papers show that the ¯t of large scale New Keynesian DSGE models is
comparable to that of more heavily parameterized models. As a consequence, a number of
central banks have begun to show interest in these models as tools for quantitative policy
analysis. Despite the success in improving the empirical performance of DSGE models,
misspeci¯cation remains a concern, as shown in Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters
(2004).
Accounting for misspeci¯cation and model uncertainty in general is an important aspect
of the assessment of monetary policies. After all, it has long been recognized that model
and parameter uncertainty a®ects optimal policies, e.g., Brainard (1967), Chow (1975), and
Craine (1979).1 This paper proposes a new method for taking model misspeci¯cation into
account when assessing the performance of alternative interest-rate feedback rules. We apply
this approach to evaluate di®erent policies in the context of a New Keynesian DSGE model,
including the estimated Volcker-Greenspan rule.
A natural approach in the presence of model uncertainty is to evaluate policy rules within
all the model speci¯cations that are under consideration. In choosing the best performing
rule one can either follow a Bayesian route, assigning probabilities to models and minimizing
the overall posterior expected loss. Alternatively, one can follow a minimax strategy by
adopting a policy that minimizes the worst-case loss across models. The literature contains
numerous applications of these ideas, e.g., McCallum (1988), Levin, Wieland, and Williams
(1999, 2003), Rudebusch (2001, 2002), Onatski and Stock (2002), Onatski and Williams
(2003), Brock, Durlauf, and West (2004), Cogley and Sargent (2005), and Hansen and
Sargent (2005). All these papers di®er with regard to the type of models included in the
1The distinction between model and parameter uncertainty is somewhat arti¯cial. By enlarging the
parameter space appropriately, we can always absorb di®erent model speci¯cations.2
model set, and the formulation of the decision problem that leads to the choice of a preferred
policy.
Our analysis di®ers from previous work with respect to the method that is used to
construct a model set and assign probabilities to these models so that a Bayesian calculation
of posterior expected performance is possible. We start from a DSGE model in which
monetary policy is modelled through an interest-rate feedback rule. The DSGE model
imposes cross-coe±cient restrictions on a vector autoregressive representation of the data.
While we are assuming that the data obey a vector autoregressive law of motion, we allow
for potential deviations from the cross-coe±cient restrictions. At the same time we maintain
the assumption that monetary policy follows the same interest-rate rule as in the DSGE
model. This collection of identi¯ed vector autoregressions forms our model set.
We place a prior distribution on the structural parameters of the DSGE model and on
parameters that characterize the discrepancies between the DSGE model restrictions and
the vector autoregressive law of motion. In constructing this prior we follow our earlier work
in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2004). Roughly speaking, the prior for the discrepancies is
centered at zero and has a covariance matrix that is scaled by a hyperparameter which
is denoted by ¸. If ¸ is large, then the prior for the discrepancies concentrates near zero,
re°ecting the belief that a potential misspeci¯cation of the DSGE model restrictions is small.
Vice versa, small values of ¸ induce a prior that implies large misspeci¯cation.
Our procedure works in two steps. First, we construct a posterior for the hyperparame-
ter ¸, determining the overall extent of misspeci¯cation on the basis of the available sample.
Conditional on the estimated ¸ we compute a posterior for the DSGE model and the dis-
crepancy parameters. Next, we evaluate the outcome of alternative policy rules under the
simplifying assumption that the public believes the new policy to be in place inde¯nitely
after being announced credibly. We evaluate di®erent policies by studying their impact on
the volatility of the three variables we use for estimation: in°ation, output gap, and the
interest rate. For expositional purposes we sometimes use a summary measure that weights
the variances of these three variables. An important feature of our analysis is that we use
the historical observations to learn about the degree of DSGE model misspeci¯cation. The
smaller the estimated degree of misspeci¯cation, the more our policy analysis relies on the
DSGE model.
Following early work by McCallum (1988) a number of recent papers study the perfor-
mance of di®erent interest-rate feedback rules across a variety of macroeconometric models,
including models that are currently used by the Board of Governors and the European3
Central Bank to analyze monetary policy. Examples of this line of research include Levin,
Wieland, and Williams (1999, 2003), Taylor (1999), Coenen (2003), Levin and Williams
(2003), Brock, Durlauf, and West (2004), and Adalid, Coenen, McAdam, and Siviero (2005).
As in our paper, policy performance is measured by a weighted average of unconditional vari-
ances of output, in°ation, and interest rates. While the class of models considered in these
papers is arguably broad and contains both forward-looking as well as backward-looking
speci¯cations, with the exception of Brock, Durlauf, and West (2004) little or no attention
is paid to ¯t and forecasting performance when weighting predictions from various models.
Hence, potentially too much weight is given to speci¯cations that are clearly at odds with
the data. By using likelihood-based measures of ¯t, the approach proposed in this paper
guarantees that model speci¯cations that have performed well historically receive a lot of
weight in the policy loss calculation.
Our framework is rich enough to encompass existing approaches to policy analysis such
as the evaluation of policy rules directly based on DSGE models or by replacing the policy
rule in identi¯ed vector autoregressions, e.g. Sims (1999), as polar cases. Speci¯cally, we
consider four assumptions about the policy invariance of the misspeci¯cation parameters
and calculate posterior expected variances as a function of the policy parameters. The ¯rst
scenario { used as a benchmark { simply ignores misspeci¯cation and computes the variances
assuming the DSGE model correctly describes the data. The ¯rst scenario corresponds to the
type of analysis conducted by Laforte (2003), and Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams
(2005). These papers estimate New Keynesian DSGE models similar to the one used here
with Bayesian methods to study the e®ects of uncertainty about structural parameters on
optimal monetary policy. If uncertainty about taste and technology parameters is certainly
important, we ¯nd that the uncertainty about the model speci¯cation is at least equally
important. Our estimates of ¸ indeed suggest that policymakers cannot a®ord to ignore
misspeci¯cation in the New Keynesian model.2
The remaining three scenarios are an attempt to incorporate the concern about model
speci¯cation in the policy recommendations derived from DSGE models. The second sce-
nario assumes that the policymaker is willing to learn from historical data about the overall
degree of model misspeci¯cation, but not about its precise nature. In computing the ex-
pected variances for a given policy she therefore uses her prior beliefs about the misspec-
i¯cation parameters conditional on ¸. In the third and fourth scenarios the policymaker
2The out-of-sample forecasting results obtained by Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2004)
are consistent with this conclusion.4
learns from the data about the misspeci¯cation parameters, that is, uses the posterior dis-
tribution of the misspeci¯cation parameters in computing the loss. In the third scenario the
policymaker assumes that misspeci¯cation is policy invariant, while in the fourth scenario
she uses the conditional distribution of the misspeci¯cation and policy parameters to let the
misspeci¯cation vary with policy.
The trade-o® between theoretical coherence and empirical ¯t of econometric models
poses a challenge to quantitative policy evaluation. The optimization-based general equi-
librium structure of DSGE models lends credibility to its predictions of the e®ect of policy
changes on the behavior of private agents. Moreover, the underlying utility functions can
be used to construct welfare-based measures of policy performance. On the other hand,
evidence on the DSGE model's inability to ¯t historical data as well as other speci¯cations
casts doubt on the model's quantitative implications. We view the DSGE-VAR framework
developed in this paper as a diagnostic tool. If the estimate of ¸ provides evidence of misspec-
i¯cation, our methods down-weigh the DSGE model predictions of changes in private-sector
behavior and rely more on the estimated reduced-form representation of household and ¯rm
behavior. Hence, policy recommendations obtained from the DSGE model can be evaluated
under data-driven perturbations of the DSGE model restrictions.
We ¯nd that the outcomes associated with di®erent policies change as misspeci¯cation
is taken into account.3 In particular, the increase in in°ation volatility associated with
policies that deviate from the DSGE model prescriptions may not be nearly as large as policy
analysis under the DSGE model would suggest. At the same time, our results indicate that
following those prescriptions, even under misspeci¯cation, leads to outcomes that are not
substantially inferior to those of rules that perform slightly better under misspeci¯cation. In
summary, a fairly robust policy recommendation emerges from our analysis: the central bank
should avoid strong responses to output gap movements and not react weakly to in°ation
°uctuations. Moreover, we ¯nd that the best-performing rules are those with a substantial
degree of inertia in the policy instrument. An implication of these ¯ndings is that the gains
associated with deviating from the historical Volcker-Greenspan policy, whenever positive,
are generally not very large. This suggests that the historical rule, if not always optimal
among those we consider, has been reasonably good at least from the perspective of this
New Keynesian DSGE model, even taking misspeci¯cation into account.
3Preliminary empirical results based on a simple three-equation New Keynesian model without capital
accumulation and variable factor utilization were reported in the 2005 Proceedings Volume of the Journal
of the European Economic Association, Del Negro and Schorfheide (2005).5
The literature is fairly divided between Bayesian and minimax or robust approaches to
resolve model uncertainty. Rather than placing a prior distribution on the misspeci¯cation
parameters, the robustness literature speci¯es either a static or dynamic two-player zero-sum
game in which a malevolent \nature" chooses the misspeci¯cation parameters to harm the
policymaker. Examples are Tetlow and von zur Muehlen (2001), Giannoni (2002), Onatski
and Stock (2002), some of the analysis in Levin and Williams (2003), Onatski and Williams
(2003), and the robust control approach developed in the monograph by Hansen and Sargent
(2005). The disadvantage of this approach is that the resulting policy performs well in the
worst-case but possibly poorly on average. A key di±culty in the use of minimax rules
is to constrain the model set and to bound the worst case. In most formulations of the
minimax problem the policymaker does not use historical data to learn about the extent of
model misspeci¯cation. An exception is Onatski and Williams (2003), who bound deviations
from the Rudebusch-Svenson (1999) model in a minimax calculation based on a con¯dence
set derived from a posterior distribution. In Hansen and Sargent's approach the relevant
model set is constructed by bounding the Kullback-Leibler discrepancy between the models
contained in the set and a reference model, so that it becomes di±cult to discriminate
among them based on statistical methods. In fact, the minimax approach is arguably most
compelling if there is little or no empirical evidence available that can discriminate between
model speci¯cations.
While our paper emphasizes a Bayesian resolution of uncertainty, our framework is
general enough to enable a risk-sensitive analysis. More speci¯cally, using a result from
Jacobsen (1973) we compute posterior expected losses for an exponential transformation of
our summary measure of weighted variances. The resulting risk can be interpreted as the
Nash-equilibrium of a zero-sum game in which \nature" distorts the probability distribution
of the misspeci¯cation parameters subject to a penalty that is a function of the Kullback-
Leibler discrepancy between the distorted and the non-distorted probabilities.
The paper is organized as follows. The DSGE model is presented in Section 2. This
model is based on work by Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2002), Smets and
Wouters (2003), and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). Compared to the bench-
mark New Keynesian models discussed, for instance, in Woodford (2003), our model has
been subjected to a number of modi¯cations, all designed to improve its empirical ¯t. Sec-
tion 3 discusses the estimation of potentially misspeci¯ed DSGE models. Bayesian inference
is implemented through Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods described in the Appendix.
The framework for policy analysis is introduced in Section 4. Section 5 describes the data6
set and discusses our empirical ¯ndings, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
This section describes the DSGE model, which is based on work by Altig, Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Linde (2002), Smets and Wouters (2003), and Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005). The model contains nominal price rigidities, capital accumulation subject
to adjustment costs, variable factor utilization, and habit formation. Unlike the above-
mentioned authors we restrict our empirical analysis to three variables: nominal interest
rates, in°ation rates and the output gap. Moreover, we abstract from wage rigidities. The
reason for this departure is computational. Bayesian posterior calculations in the framework
developed in Section 3 are more di±cult to implement than in the direct estimation pursued
in Smets and Wouters (2003) and the alternative DSGE-VAR setup used in Del Negro and
Schorfheide (2004) and Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2004). Since we do not
use wage data in our empirical analysis it is di±cult to disentangle price and wage rigidity.
Indeed, we did estimate a version of the model that includes wage rigidity but found its ¯t
(adjusted for the additional model complexity) to be worse than the baseline speci¯cation
with °exible wages.
2.1 Final Goods Producers
The ¯nal good Yt is a composite made of a continuum of intermediate goods Yt(i), indexed
by i 2 [0;1]:
Yt =
·Z 1
0
Yt(i)
1
1+¸f di
¸1+¸f
: (1)
The ¯nal goods producers are perfectly competitive ¯rms that buy intermediate goods,
combine them to the ¯nal product Yt, and resell the ¯nal good to consumers. The ¯rms
maximize pro¯ts
PtYt ¡
Z
Pt(i)Yt(i)di
subject to (1). Here Pt denotes the price of the ¯nal good and Pt(i) is the price of inter-
mediate good i. From their ¯rst order conditions and the zero-pro¯t condition we obtain
that:
Yt(i) =
µ
Pt(i)
Pt
¶¡
1+¸f
¸f
Yt and Pt =
·Z 1
0
Pt(i)
1
¸f di
¸¸f
: (2)
We de¯ne aggregate in°ation as ¼t = Pt=Pt¡1.7
2.2 Intermediate goods producers
Good i is made using the technology:
Yt(i) = max
½
Kt(i)®[°(t)ZtLt(i)]1¡®;0
¾
; (3)
where the technology shock Zt (common across all ¯rms) follows a stationary autoregressive
process
ln(Zt=Z¤) = ½z ln(Zt¡1=Z¤) + ¾z²z;t (4)
and the function °(t) induces a trend into productivity. All ¯rms face the same prices for
their inputs, labor and capital. Hence cost minimization implies that the capital/labor ratio
is the same for all ¯rms, and equal to:
Kt
Lt
=
®
1 ¡ ®
Wt
Rk
t
; (5)
where Wt is the nominal wage and Rk
t is the rental rate of capital. Following Calvo (1983)
we assume that in every period a fraction of ¯rms ³p is unable to re-optimize their prices
Pt(i). These ¯rms adjust their prices mechanically according to
Pt(i) = ¼¤Pt¡1(i); (6)
where ¼¤ is the steady state in°ation rate of the ¯nal good.4 Firms that are able to re-
optimize prices choose the price level ~ Pt(i) by solving
max ~ Pt(i) I Et
P1
s=0 ³s
p¯s¥
p
t+s
³
~ Pt(i)(¼¤)s ¡ MCt+s
´
Yt+s(i)
s.t. Yt+s(i) =
µ ~ Pt(i)(¼¤)
s
Pt+s
¶¡
1+¸f
¸f
Yt+s; MCt+s =
®
¡®W
1¡®
t+s R
k ®
t+s
(1¡®)(1¡®)Z
1¡®
t+s
:
(7)
where ¯s¥
p
t+s is today's value of a future dollar for the consumers and MCt re°ects marginal
costs. We consider only the symmetric equilibrium where all ¯rms will choose the same ~ Pt(i).
Hence from (2) we obtain the following law of motion for the aggregate price level:
Pt =
·
(1 ¡ ³p) ~ P
1
¸f
t + ³p(¼¤Pt¡1)
1
¸f
¸¸f
: (8)
2.3 Households
There is a continuum of households, indexed by j 2 [0;1]. The objective function for each
household is given by:
I Et
1 X
s=0
¯s
"
log(Ct+s(j) ¡ hCt+s¡1(j)) ¡
'
1 + ºl
Lt+s(j)1+ºl +
Â
1 ¡ ºm
µ
Mt+s(j)
°(t + s)Pt+s
¶1¡ºm
#
(9)
4We also estimated a version of the DSGE model with dynamic price indexation Pt(i) = ¼t¡1Pt¡1(i)
but found that the time series ¯t did not improve.8
where Ct(j) is consumption, Lt(j) is labor supply, and Mt(j) are money holdings. House-
holds' preferences display habit-persistence. Real money balances enter the utility function
de°ated by the trend growth of the economy to make real money demand stationary.
Household j's budget constraint written in nominal terms is given by:
Pt+sCt+s(j) + Pt+sIt+s(j) + Bt+s(j) + Mt+s(j) · Rt+sBt+s¡1(j) + Mt+s¡1(j) + At+s¡1(j)
+ ¦t+s + Wt+s(j)Lt+s(j) +
¡
Rk
t+sut+s(j) ¹ Kt+s¡1(j) ¡ Pt+sa(ut+s(j)) ¹ Kt+s¡1(j)
¢
;
(10)
where It(j) is investment, Bt(j) is holdings of government bonds, Rt is the gross nom-
inal interest rate paid on government bonds, At(j) is the net cash in°ow from trading
state-contingent securities, ¦t is the per-capita pro¯t the household gets from owning ¯rms
(households pool their ¯rm shares, and they all receive the same pro¯t), and Wt(j) is the
nominal wage earned by household j. The term within parenthesis represents the return to
owning ¹ Kt(j) units of capital. Households choose the utilization rate of their own capital,
ut(j). Households rent to ¯rms in period t an amount of e®ective capital equal to:
Kt(j) = ut(j) ¹ Kt¡1(j); (11)
and receive Rk
tut(j) ¹ Kt¡1(j) in return. They however have to pay a cost of utilization in
terms of the consumption good equal to a(ut(j)) ¹ Kt¡1(j). Households accumulate capital
according to the equation:
¹ Kt(j) = (1 ¡ ±) ¹ Kt¡1(j) +
µ
1 ¡ S
µ
It(j)
It¡1(j)
¶¶
It(j); (12)
where ± is the rate of depreciation, and S(¢) is the cost of adjusting investment, with
S0(¢) > 0;S00(¢) > 0.
We assume that the labor market is perfectly competitive and wages are °exible. Fi-
nally, we assume there is a complete set of state contingent securities in nominal terms,
which implies that the Lagrange multiplier associated with (10) must be the same for all
households in all periods and across all states of the world. This in turn implies that in equi-
librium households will make the same choices and can be aggregated into a representative
household.9
2.4 Government Policies
The central bank follows a nominal interest rate rule by adjusting its instrument in response
to deviations of in°ation and output from their respective target levels:
Rt
R¤ =
µ
Rt¡1
R¤
¶½R
"µ
¼t
¼¤
¶Ã1 µ
Yt
Y
p
t¡1
¶Ã2
#1¡½R
¾Re²R;t; (13)
where R¤ is the steady state nominal rate, Y
p
t is a measure of potential output, and the
parameter ½R determines the degree of interest rate smoothing. The government budget
constraint is of the form
PtGt + Rt¡1Bt¡1 + Mt¡1 = Tt + Mt + Bt; (14)
where Tt are nominal lump-sum taxes (or subsidies) that also appear in the household's
budget constraint. Government spending is given by:
Gt = (1 ¡ 1=gt)Yt; (15)
where gt follows the process:
lngt = (1 ¡ ½g)lng + ½g lngt¡1 + ¾g²g;t: (16)
2.5 Resource Constraint
The aggregate resource constraint
Ct + It + a(ut) ¹ Kt¡1 =
1
gt
Yt (17)
can be derived by integrating the budget constraint (10) across households, and combining
it with the government budget constraint (14) and the zero pro¯t conditions of the ¯nal
good producers.
2.6 Model Solution and State-Space Representation
Our model economy evolves along a balanced growth path, generated by the trend in tech-
nology. Output, consumption, investment, real wage, physical capital and e®ective capital
all grow according to °(t). Nominal interest rates, in°ation, and hours worked are station-
ary. The model can be rewritten in terms of detrended variables. We ¯nd the steady states
for the detrended variables and use the method in Sims (2002) to construct a log-linear
approximation of the model around the steady state.10
Our empirical analysis is based on data on nominal interest rates Ra
t (annualized per-
centages), in°ation rates ¼a
t (annualized percentages), and the log output gap. Hence, we
de¯ne the vector of observations as yt = [Ra
t;¼a
t ;100lnY
g
t ]0. The relationships between the
percentage deviations from steady state e Rt, e ¼t, e Yt derived from the DSGE model and the
observables yt are given by the following measurement equation:
y1;t = r¤
a + °a + ¼¤
a + 4e Rt; (18)
y2;t =
2
4 ¼¤
a + 4e ¼t
e Yt
3
5:
Here, we have partitioned yt such that y1;t corresponds to the policymaker's instrument
(the interest rate), and y2;t is a vector that includes the remaining two observables. The
steady state (net) real interest rate in our model is given by r¤
a+°a, where °a is the average
annual growth rate of the economy. The parameter r¤
a is related to the discount rate ¯
according to ¯ = 1=(1 + r¤
a=400). Within the model, e Yt denotes the percentage deviation
of output from its trend path °(t)Y ¤. We interpret the potential output series published
by the Congressional Budget O±ce (CBO) as a measure of °(t)Y ¤. Hence, the output gap,
computed as log di®erence of real and potential GDP provides us with a measure of e Yt. The
monetary policy rule can be rewritten in terms of observables as follows:
y1;t = (1 ¡ ½R)[(r¤
a + °a + ¼¤
a) ¡ Ã1 ln¼¤
a] + y1;t¡1½R + y0
2;t
2
4 (1 ¡ ½R)Ã1
4(1 ¡ ½R)Ã2
3
5 + ¾R²R (19)
We collect all the DSGE model parameters in the vector µ and stack the structural shocks
in the vector ²t.
3 Setup and Inference
In the subsequent analysis it is assumed that the DSGE model generates a covariance-
stationary distribution of the sequence fytg for all µ 2 £. Expectations under this dis-
tribution are denoted by I E
D
µ [¢]. We will derive an (approximate) vector autoregressive
representation for the DSGE model and introduce model misspeci¯cations as deviations
from this representation.5 Unlike in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2004) and Del Negro,
Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2004), we assume that the interest rate feedback rule in
the DSGE model is correctly speci¯ed and do not relax the restriction generated by the
5We are working with vector autoregressive approximations rather than with state-space models to
simplify the simulation of the posterior distributions.11
policy rule. Finally, we specify a prior distribution for these model misspeci¯cations and
discuss posterior inference and policy analysis.
3.1 A VAR Representation of the DSGE Model
Let us rewrite Equation (13), which describes the policymaker's behavior, in more general
form as:
y1;t = x0
tM1¯1(µ) + y0
2;tM2¯2(µ) + ²1;t; (20)
where yt = [y1;t;y0
2;t]0 and the k £ 1 vector xt = [y0
t¡1;:::;y0
t¡p;1]0 is composed of the ¯rst
p lags of yt and an intercept. The shock ²1;t corresponds to the monetary policy shock
¾R²R;t in the DSGE model. The matrices M1 and M2 select the appropriate elements
of xt and y2;t to generate the policy rule. In our application the vector M1 selects the
intercept and the lagged nominal interest rate and the matrix M2 extracts in°ation, and
the output gap. The functions ¯1(µ) and ¯2(µ) are implicitly provided in Equation (19).
Considering forecast-based policy rules in this framework would require signi¯cant modi¯ca-
tions. However, according to the ¯ndings reported by Levin, Wieland, and Williams (2003)
forecast-based rules do not provide substantial gains in stabilization performance compared
with simple outcome-based rules. Hence, we decided not to pursue these modi¯cations at
this point.
The remainder of the system for yt is given by the following reduced form equations:
y0
2;t = x0
tª¤(µ) + u0
2;t: (21)
In general, the VAR representation (21) is not exact if the number of lags p is ¯nite. We
de¯ne ¡XX(µ) = I E
D
µ [xtx0
t] and ¡XY2(µ) = I E
D
µ [xty0
2;t] and let
ª¤(µ) = ¡
¡1
XX(µ)¡XY2(µ): (22)
Since the system is covariance stationary, the VAR approximation of the autocovariance
sequence of y2;t can be made arbitrarily precise by increasing the number of lags p. If
in addition, the moving-average (MA) representation of the DSGE model in terms of the
structural shocks ²t is invertible, then u2;t can also be expressed as a function of ²t for large
p. Conditions for invertibility and results on the accuracy of this VAR approximation can
be found in Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramirez, and Sargent (2005).
The equation for the policy instrument (20) can be rewritten by replacing y2;t with
expression (21):
y1;t = x0
tM1¯1(µ) + x0
tª¤(µ)M2¯2(µ) + u1;t; (23)12
where u1;t = u0
2;tM2¯2(µ) + ²1;t. De¯ne u0
t = [u1;t;u0
2;t], B1(µ) = [M1¯1(µ);0k£(n¡1)],
B2(µ) = [M2¯2(µ);I(n¡1)£(n¡1)], and let
©¤(µ) = B1(µ) + ª¤(µ)B2(µ): (24)
Hence, we obtain a restricted VAR for yt
y0
t = x0
t© + u0
t; I E[utu0
t] = §¤(µ) (25)
with
© = ©¤(µ); § = §¤(µ) = ¡Y Y (µ) ¡ ¡Y X(µ)¡
¡1
XX(µ)¡XY (µ):
Here the population covariance matrices are ¡Y Y (µ) = I E
D
µ [yty0
t] and ¡XY (µ) = ¡0
Y X(µ) =
I E
D
µ [xty0
t].
Since the monetary policy rule (13) in the DSGE model is speci¯ed so that it can
be exactly reproduced by the VAR, see Equation (20), ©¤(µ) equals the population least
squares coe±cients associated with (25), and the covariance matrix of xt under the DSGE
model and its VAR approximation are identical. We will subsequently ignore the error
made by approximating the state space representation of the DSGE model with the ¯nite-
order VAR or, in other words, treat (25) as the structural model that imposes { potentially
misspeci¯ed { cross-equation restrictions on the matrices © and §. We can do so because
we have checked that the impulse responses from the VAR representation of the DSGE
model { obtained using the identi¯cation scheme discussed in Section 3.3 { match almost
exactly those of the DSGE model even when the lag length is four (results are available
upon request).
3.2 Misspeci¯cation and Bayesian Inference
We make the following assumptions about misspeci¯cation of the DSGE model. There is a
vector µ and matrices ª¢ and §¢ such that the data are generated from the VAR in (25)
© = B1(µ) + (ª¤(µ) + ª¢)B2(µ); § = §¤(µ) + §¢ (26)
and there does not exist a ~ µ 2 £ such that
© = B1(~ µ) + ª¤(~ µ)B2(~ µ); § = §¤(~ µ):
We refer to the resulting speci¯cation as DSGE-VAR. A stylized graphical representation
of our notion of misspeci¯cation can be found in Figure 1. Our econometric analysis is cast13
in a Bayesian framework in which initial beliefs about the DSGE model parameter µ and
the model misspeci¯cation matrices ª¢ and §¢ are summarized in a prior distribution. In
order to compare a Bayesian approach to model misspeci¯cation to a minimax approach, the
reader might ¯nd it helpful to think of a ¯ctitious other, \nature," that draws the misspec-
i¯cation matrices ª¢ and §¢ from a distribution { the prior { rather than maximizing the
loss function to harm the policymaker. The remainder of this section describes the choice
of this prior.
Our prior is based on the idea that \nature" is more likely to draw smaller than larger
misspeci¯cation matrices, re°ecting the belief that the DSGE model provides a good albeit
not perfect approximation of reality. Speci¯cally, we assume that the prior density decreases
the larger the size of the discrepancies ª¢ and §¢. In the spirit of Hansen and Sargent's
(2005) approach to model misspeci¯cation and robust control, the size of the discrepancies
is determined by the ease with which they can be detected via likelihood ratios. This metric
determines the shape of the prior contours (see Figure 1). The mass placed on these contours
is determined by the parameter ¸. Large values of ¸ imply that large discrepancies are less
likely to occur. Hence, the parameter ¸ measures the overall degree of misspeci¯cation. We
will now further motivate and explain the prior distribution using a thought experiment,
where for ease of exposition we set §¢ = 0 and ¯x the DSGE model parameter vector µ.
Suppose that a sample of ¸T observations is generated from the DSGE model (that is,
from Equation (25), where © = ©¤). Here T denotes the size of the actual sample used in the
estimation. We will construct a prior that has the property that its density is proportional
to the expected likelihood ratio of ª evaluated at its (misspeci¯ed) restricted value ª ¤ (µ)
versus the true value ª = ª¤(µ) + ª¢. The log-likelihood ratio is
ln
·
L(ª¤;§¤;µjY;X)
L(ª¤ + ª¢;§¤;µjY;X)
¸
= ¡
1
2
tr
·
§¤¡1
µ
B0
2ª¤
0
X0Xª¤B2 ¡ 2B0
2ª¤
0
X0(Y ¡ XB1)
¡B0
2(ª¤ + ª¢)0X0X(ª¤ + ª¢)B2
+2B0
2(ª¤ + ª¢)0X0(Y ¡ XB1)
¶¸
:
Here Y denotes the ¸T £ n matrix with rows y0
t and Xt is the ¸T £ k matrix with rows x0
t.
After replacing Y by X(B1 + (ª¤ + ª¢)B2) + U the log likelihood ratio simpli¯es to
ln
·
L(ª¤;§¤;µjY;X)
L(ª¤ + ª¢;§¤;µjY;X)
¸
(27)
= ¡
1
2
tr
·
§¤¡1
µ
B0
2ª¢
0
X0Xª¢B2 ¡ 2B0
2ª¢
0
X0U
¶¸
Taking expectations over X and U using the distribution induced by the data generating
process yields (minus) the Kullback-Leibler discrepancy between the data generating process14
and the DSGE model:
I E
V AR
ª¤;§¤
·
ln
L(ª¤;§¤;µjY;X)
L(ª¤ + ª¢;§¤;µjY;X)
¸
= ¡
1
2
tr
·
§¤¡1
µ
¸TB0
2ª¢
0
¡XXª¢B2
¶¸
: (28)
Here we have used the relationship I E
V AR
ª¤(µ);§¤(µ)[xtx0
t] = I E
D
µ [xtx0
t] = ¡XX(µ), where the ¯rst
term refers to expectation taken with respect to the probability distribution generated by
the VAR. We choose a prior density for ª¢ that is proportional (/) to the Kullback-Leibler
discrepancy:
p(ª¢j§¤;µ) / exp
½
¡
¸T
2
tr
·
§¤¡1
µ
B0
2ª¢
0
¡XXª¢B2
¶¸¾
(29)
The hyperparameter ¸ determines the length of the hypothetical sample as a multiple of the
actual sample size T. This hyperparameter \scales" the overall degree of misspeci¯cation.
For high values of ¸, it is easy to tell the misspeci¯ed model and the DSGE model apart
even for small values of the misspeci¯cation ª¢. Hence the prior density places most of its
mass near the restrictions imposed by the DSGE model when ¸ is large, and for ¸ = 1 the
misspeci¯cation disappears altogether. On the contrary, if ¸ is close to zero the Kullback-
Leibler discrepancy can be small even for relatively large values of the discrepancy ª¢.
Hence the prior is fairly di®use. For computational reasons it is convenient to transform this
prior into a prior for ª. Using standard arguments we deduce that this prior is multivariate
normal
ªj§¤;µ » N
Ã
ª¤(µ);
1
¸T
·
(B2(µ)§¤¡1B2(µ)0) ­ ¡XX(µ)
¸¡1!
: (30)
In practice we also have to take potential misspeci¯cation of the covariance matrix
§¤(µ) into account. Hence, we will use the following, slightly modi¯ed, prior distribution
conditional on µ in the empirical analysis:
ªj§;µ » N
Ã
ª¤(µ);
1
¸T
·
(B2(µ)§¡1B2(µ)0) ­ ¡XX(µ)
¸¡1!
(31)
§jµ » IW
µ
¸T§¤(µ);¸T ¡ k;n
¶
;
where IW denotes the inverted Wishart distribution. The latter induces a distribution for
the discrepancy §¢ = § ¡ §¤.
The Appendix provides a characterization of the following conditional posterior densi-
ties:
p(ªj§;µ;Y ); p(§jª;µ;Y ); and p(µjª;§;Y ):
Unfortunately, it is not possible to give a characterization of all conditional distributions
in terms of well-known probability distributions. To implement the Gibbs sampler we have15
to introduce two Metropolis steps that generate draws from the conditional distributions
p(§jª;µ;Y ) and p(µjª;§;Y ). The resulting Markov-Chain-Monte-Carlo (MCMC) algo-
rithm is known as Metropolis-within-Gibbs sampler and allows us to generate draws from
the joint posterior distribution of µ, ª, and §. In addition to the posterior distribution of
the parameters we are also interested in evaluating marginal data densities of the form
p¸(Y ) =
Z
p(Y jµ;§;©)p¸(µ;§;©)d(µ;§;©) (32)
for various choices of the hyperparameter ¸ and restrictions on the parameter space of the
DSGE model. Based on the marginal data densities we can compute Bayes factors and
posterior probabilities for the various speci¯cations of our model. Under the assumption of
equal prior probabilities, ratios of marginal likelihoods can be interpreted as model odds.
While the numerical value of ¸ itself may be di±cult to interpret, a comparison of DSGE and
DSGE-VAR impulse response functions will enable us to assess the degree of misspeci¯cation
implied by a particular value of ¸.
3.3 Identi¯cation
The model developed in the preceding subsections is of the form
y1;t = x0
tM1¯1 + x0
tªM2¯2 + u1;t (33)
y0
2;t = x0
tª + u0
2;t;
where u1;t = u0
2;tM2¯2+²1;t. The policy rule coe±cients ¯1 and ¯2, and hence the monetary
policy shock ²1;t = ¾R²R;t are identi¯able. Unlike in a standard VAR, identi¯cation is
achieved through exclusion restrictions: lagged in°ation and output gap do not enter the
monetary policy rule by assumption. According to the underlying structural model, the
one-step-ahead forecast errors u2;t are a function of the monetary policy shock ²1;t and the
two other structural shocks ²2;t = [²g;t;²z;t]0:
u0
2;t = ²1;tA1 + ²0
2;tA2:
Straightforward matrix algebra leads to the following formulas for the e®ect of the structural
shocks on u0
2;t:
A1 =
·
§11 ¡ ¯0
2M0
2§22M2¯2 ¡ 2(§12 ¡ ¯0
2M0
2§22)M2¯2
¸¡1
(§12 ¡ ¯0
2M0
2§22)
A0
2A2 = §22 ¡ A0
1
·
§11 ¡ ¯0
2M0
2§22M2¯2 ¡ 2(§12 ¡ ¯0
2M0
2§22)M2¯2
¸
A116
Here, § denotes the covariance matrix of ut, and the partitions of § conform with the
partition of u0
t = [u1;t;u0
2;t]. Once A1 is determined, the impulse response function with
respect to the monetary policy shock can be calculated.
In order to identify A2 an additional assumption is needed. We follow the approach taken
in Del Negro and Schorfheide (2004). Let A0
2;trA2;tr = A0
2A2 be the Cholesky decomposition
of A0
2A2. The relationship between A2;tr and A2 is given by A0
2 = A0
2;tr­, where ­ is an
orthonormal matrix that is not identi¯able based on the estimates of ¯(µ), ª, and §.
However, we are able to calculate an initial e®ect of ²2;t on y2;t based on the DSGE model,
denoted by AD
2 (µ). This matrix can be uniquely decomposed into a lower triangular matrix
and an orthonormal matrix:
AD
0
2 (µ) = AD
0
2;tr(µ)­¤(µ):
To identify A2 above, we combine A0
2;tr with ­¤(µ).6 Loosely speaking, the rotation matrix
is constructed such that in the absence of misspeci¯cation the DSGE's and the DSGE-VAR's
impulse responses to ²2;t would coincide. To the extent that misspeci¯cation is mainly in the
dynamics as opposed to the covariance matrix of innovations, the identi¯cation procedure
can be interpreted as matching, at least qualitatively, the short-run responses of the VAR
with those from the DSGE model.
4 Policy Analysis
We are interested in assessing the e®ects of changing the existing policy rule between time
and on the °uctuations of the interest rate, in°ation, and the output gap. We make the
simplifying assumption that the public believes the new policy to be in place inde¯nitely
after being announced credibly. The policymaker does not exploit the fact that at the time
of the announcement the public has formed its expectations based on the old policy rule.
Our assumptions characterize one of the polar cases that arises in a more realistic setting in
which there are multiple types of policy shifts (using the terminology of Sims, 1982) ranging
from normal policymaking that corresponds to unanticipated deviations from a policy rule to
rare regime shifts that can be viewed as persistent changes in the central bank's systematic
reaction to macroeconomic fundamentals.
6The calculation is easily implementable in a Markov Chain Monte Carlo analysis. For every draw of
(µ;ª¢;§¢) from their joint posterior distribution we compute ­¤(µ) and A2.17
4.1 Evaluating Policies
The goal of our analysis is to study the e®ects of changes in the policy parameters µp on
the variability of key macroeconomic variables, namely, output gap, in°ation, and interest
rates. We partition the vector µ into policy rule parameters µp and taste-and-technology
parameters µs and denote the unconditional covariance matrix of the endogenous variables
by V(µp;µs;ª¢;§¢). Consistent with the DSGE model, we assume that the mean of the
variables is invariant to changes in the policy parameters Ã1, Ã2, and ½R. In our empirical
analysis we examine tr[WV] for various choices of the weight matrix W. Here tr[¢] denotes
the trace of a matrix. In particular we consider the variances of individual variables, which
can be obtained by setting all elements of W to zero, except for one diagonal element, which
is set equal to one. Moreover, we consider a summary measure of performance by choosing
a W that is diagonal with entries 1=4 (annualized interest rates), 1 (annualized in°ation
rates), and 1=4 (output gap, percentage deviations from potential output). To ensure that
the posterior expected value of the variance is well de¯ned when averaging over µs, ª¢, and
§¢, we truncate the weighted variances at the level B, that is, we report
min fB;tr[WV(µp;µs;ª¢;§¢)]g
The upper bound B is set to 50. This value is substantially larger than the sample variances
of the output gap, in°ation, and interest rates, which are approximately 2.9, 2.1, and 6,
respectively, in our estimation sample.
One advantage of conducting policy evaluation under DSGE models is the use of welfare-
based measures. These measures lose some of their appeal in the presence of misspeci¯cation:
To the extent that the discrepancies ª¢ and §¢ are caused by a misspeci¯cation of the
household's preferences, a representation of consumer welfare derived from the DSGE model
is potentially unreliable. Therefore, we choose to focus on the implications of di®erent rules
on the variability of the endogenous variables. Arguably this is also the measure used in
practice by many central banks in evaluating policies.
We interpret monetary policy shocks as discretionary deviations from the interest-rate
feedback rule. Since the monetary policy shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated with the
remaining structural shocks in the economy they increase the variability of the endogenous
variables. Hence, deviations ²R;t from the policy rule are undesirable. In our empirical
analysis we therefore use the procedure described in Section 3.3 to identify the monetary
policy shocks and then set their standard deviation to zero, focusing on the °uctuations
caused by technology and government spending shocks.18
4.2 Taking Misspeci¯cation into Account
We assume that there is imperfect knowledge about: (i) the policy invariant taste and
technology parameters µs and (ii) the degree of model misspeci¯cation captured by ¸, ª¢
and §¢. The uncertainty is summarized in the posterior distribution.
We consider four di®erent scenarios for the policy invariance of the misspeci¯cation
matrices ©¢ and §¢. Then we calculate the posterior expectations of the performance
measure min fB;tr[WV]g for di®erent policies according to each scenario. If the DSGE
model does not su®er from serious misspeci¯cation all scenarios collapse to Scenario 1. The
goal of the subsequent empirical analysis is to illustrate the sensitivity of policy predictions
when the DSGE model is embedded in a collection of identi¯ed VARs.
The challenge in the evaluation of monetary policy rules is to predict the private sector's
behavioral responses to policy regime changes. Standard VAR analysis proceeds under
the assumption that the behavioral changes are negligible. Our framework creates a link
between VAR and DSGE model parameters. Hence, it becomes possible to re-calculate the
private-sector decision rules with the DSGE model and exploit the link to make non-trivial
predictions about the private sector's behavior with the identi¯ed VAR. If the data contain
substantial evidence against the DSGE model restrictions, that is, ¸ is small, less weight is
placed on the DSGE model predictions about the behavior of the private sector.
Scenario 1 { Ignore Misspeci¯cation
The DSGE model is estimated directly and its potential misspeci¯cation is ignored. The
policymaker does, however, take the uncertainty with respect to the non-policy parameters
into account when calculating the expected loss. This scenario is explored in detail by Laforte
(2003) and Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2005). If no deviations from the DSGE
model restrictions are contemplated, then the ad-hoc performance measure introduced in the
previous subsection could be replaced by the household's utility function. Unfortunately, the
empirical evidence points toward misspeci¯cations. Once we allow for deviations from ª¤(µ)
and §¤(µ), it is doubtful that the DSGE model-based welfare function remains appropriate.
Hence, we study the e®ects of policy changes on in°ation, output gap, and interest rate
variability in all four scenarios.
Scenario 2 { Acknowledge Misspeci¯cation, Discard the Past
The policymaker believes that the sample (hence the posterior) provides no information
about potential misspeci¯cation after a regime shift has been implemented. This skepticism19
about the relevance of sample information is shared by the robust control approaches of
Onatski and Stock (2002), Onatski and Williams (2003), and Hansen and Sargent (2005).
However, instead of using a minimax calculation, our Bayesian policymaker relies on her
prior distribution p(ª¢;§¢jµ;¸) to cope with uncertainty about model misspeci¯cation.
The sample is only used to learn about the non-policy parameters µs and the overall degree
of misspeci¯cation ¸.
Scenario 3 { Learn about Misspeci¯cation (Policy Invariant)
ª¢ and §¢ are assumed to be invariant to changes in policy. The sample information
is used to learn about the model misspeci¯cation via the posterior distribution. Looking
forward, the information is used to adjust the policy predictions derived from the DSGE
model by the estimated discrepancies. To implement the analysis, we generate draws from
the marginal posterior distribution of µs, ª¢, and §¢, combine ~ µ = [~ µ0
p;µ0
s]0, and calculate
ª¤(~ µ)+ª¢ and §¤(~ µ)+§¢. Here, ~ µp is the new set of policy parameters. Since the choice
of ~ µp does not a®ect beliefs about the misspeci¯cation matrices, we refer to the treatment of
misspeci¯cation as policy invariant. This rather mechanical post-intervention adjustment of
ª¤(µ) and §¤(µ) has some undesirable properties, which will become evident in the empirical
analysis.
Scenario 4 { Learn about Misspeci¯cation (Conditional)
\Nature" generates a new set of draws from the posterior distribution of ª¢ and §¢
conditional on the post-intervention DSGE model parameters ~ µ. To implement the ex-
pected variance calculation we take a draw from the marginal posterior distribution of µs,
combine it with the policy parameter to obtain ~ µ = [~ µ0
p;µ0
s]0, and generate a draw from
p(ª¢;§¢jY T; ~ µ;¸) by iterating between the conditional distributions of ª¢ and §¢ pro-
vided in the Appendix (see Equations (A.5) and (A.7)). As before, we then calculate
ª¤(~ µ) + ª¢ and §¤(~ µ) + §¢. In this scenario, the policymaker revises her beliefs about
the misspeci¯cation matrix as she contemplates di®erent values of the policy parameters.
Hence, we use the term conditional. Roughly speaking, the calculation can be interpreted as
follows: based on the data there is uncertainty about the historical policy rule coe±cients.
Now suppose one ¯xes the policy parameters at a particular value ~ µp: what information do
the data provide about the misspeci¯cation parameters? This information is summarized
in p(ª¢;§¢jY T; ~ µ;¸). If the estimated value of ¸ is small and hence the perceived DSGE
model misspeci¯cation is large, the DSGE model's prediction of the e®ect of policy rule
changes on the reduced-form equations for the private sector become less credible. In our20
analysis the conditional posterior distribution of ª and § given µ will e®ectively become
insensitive to µ. As ¸ tends to zero we e®ectively analyze monetary policy with a VAR by
simply changing the coe±cients in the policy rule, ignoring any changes in private-sector
behavior that the policy shift might induce as in Sims (1999).
4.3 Risk-Sensitivity
So far, we placed a probability distribution over the misspeci¯cation parameters and mini-
mized posterior expected loss. There is a growing literature in economics7 that studies the
robustness of decision rules to model misspeci¯cation. Underlying this robustness analysis
is typically a static or dynamic two-person zero-sum game. The decision maker, in our case
the central bank, is minimizing a loss function while a malevolent ¯ctitious other, \nature,"
chooses the misspeci¯cation to harm the decision maker. \Nature's" choice, in our notation
ª¢ and §¢, is either limited to a bounded set or it is subject to a penalty function that
is increasing in the size of the misspeci¯cation. The policymaker's decision is robust, if it
corresponds to a Nash equilibrium in the two-person game.
In the Bayesian framework the risk sensitivity that is inherent in the robust control
approach can be introduced by transforming a loss function. Let
L(µp;µs;ª¢;§¢) = min fB;tr[WV(µp;µs;ª¢;§¢)]g:
Instead of minimizing the expected value of L(µp;µs;ª¢;§¢), the decision maker is equipped
with an exponential utility function. She considers the transformed loss e¿L, and solves
min
µp
1
¿
ln
Z
expf¿L(µp;µs;ª¢;§¢)gp(µs;ª¢;§¢)d(µs;ª¢;§¢); (34)
where p(µs;ª¢;§¢) denotes the joint density of µs, ª¢, §¢. A positive ¿ makes the
policymaker risk averse. It can be shown that the optimization of (34) is the solution to the
following zero-sum game
min
µp
max
q(µs;ª¢;§¢)
Z
L(µp;µs;ª¢;§¢)p(µs;ª¢;§¢)q(µs;ª¢;§¢)d(µs;ª¢;§¢) (35)
¡
1
¿
Z µ
lnq(µs;ª¢;§¢)
¶
p(µs;ª¢;§¢)q(µs;ª¢;§¢)d(µs;ª¢;§¢):
The maximization with respect to q(¢) is subject to the constraints
Z
p(µs;ª¢;§¢)q(µs;ª¢;§¢)d(µs;ª¢;§¢) = 1; q(µs;ª¢;§¢) ¸ 0:
7See for instance, the monograph by Hansen and Sargent (2005) or the February 2002 special issue of
Macroeconomic Dynamics.21
The interpretation of this game is that \nature" chooses the function q(¢) to distort the
probabilities from which the model (misspeci¯cation) parameters are drawn. Notice that
Z
[lnq(¢)]p(¢)q(¢)d(µs;ª¢;§¢)
=
Z
[lnp(¢)q(¢)]p(¢)q(¢)d(µs;ª¢;§¢) ¡
Z
[lnp(¢)]p(¢)q(¢)d(µs;ª¢;§¢)
is the Kullback-Leibler discrepancy between the distorted and the undistorted probabilities.
The larger ¿, the larger the penalty for deviating from p(¢). The link between the exponential
transformation of the loss function and the zero-sum game representation was pointed out
by Jacobsen (1973) in one of the ¯rst studies of optimization under a risk-sensitive criterion.
In the subsequent empirical analysis we will also compute posterior expected losses under
Scenarios 1 and 2 for the risk-sensitive version of the policy problem. Under Scenario 1 the
DSGE model itself is assumed to be correctly speci¯ed but \nature" is allowed to distort
the beliefs about the structural parameters. The larger the uncertainty about a parameter,
the easier it is to shift probability mass to create havoc. This analysis is similar in spirit to
Giannoni (2002), who assesses the robustness of monetary policy to changes in non-policy
parameters of a simple three-equation New Keynesian DSGE model. Under Scenario 2
nature can also distort beliefs about the misspeci¯cation matrices, that is, the deviation
of the \true" law of motion from the DSGE model restrictions, and hence, our analysis
becomes comparable to that of Onatski and Stock (2002) and Onatski and Williams (2003).
5 Policy Evaluation Under DSGE-VAR
Our empirical analysis is based on interest rate, in°ation, and output gap time series. We use
the CBO's potential output series and obtain all other series from Haver Analytics (Haver
mnemonics are in italics). The output gap is de¯ned as the log di®erence of real GDP
(nominal GDP divided by the chained-price de°ator JGDP) and real potential output. The
log di®erences are scaled by 100 to convert them to percentages. In°ation is computed using
quarter-to-quarter log-di®erences of the GDP de°ator, scaled by 400 to obtain annualized
percentages. The nominal rate corresponds to the e®ective federal funds rate (FFED), also
in percent. The results reported below are based on a sample from 1983:Q3 to 2004:Q1.
We begin with the estimation of the state-space representation of the DSGE model and of
the DSGE-VAR for di®erent values of ¸. We document the degree of misspeci¯cation of the
DSGE model. Next, we discuss the estimates of the \deep" parameters and the extent to
which they are identi¯ed. Finally, we proceed with the policy analysis.22
5.1 Estimation
We begin the section by discussing our assumptions on the priors for the \deep" parameters.
Since we do not use observations on consumption and investment, it is di±cult to identify
the capital share and the depreciation rate. Therefore, we let ® = 0:25 and ± = 0:025.
Moreover, in a log-linear approximation the price markup parameter ¸f, which we ¯x at
0.3, is typically not identi¯able. The parameters Â and ºm only a®ect the dynamics of the
money stock, which is not included in the set of observables. The parameter ' determines
the steady state labor supply and does not in°uence the dynamics of interest rates, in°ation,
and the output gap. We set the average annualized growth rate of the economy °a equal to
1.5%.
Priors for the remaining DSGE model parameters are provided in Table 1. All intervals
reported in the text are meant to be 90% intervals. The distribution for Ã1 and Ã2 is
approximately centered at Taylor's (1993) values, whereas the smoothing parameter lies in
the range from 0.18 to 0.83. The prior mean for the growth-adjusted real interest rate,
r¤
a + °a, is 2.5% and annualized steady state in°ation ranges from 0 to 6.25%, which is
consistent with pre-1982 long-run historical averages. The prior mean of g¤ implies that
that the government share of GDP is 15%. According to our prior the habit persistence
parameter h lies between 0.55 and 0.85. Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) found that
a value of 0.7 enhances the ability of a standard DSGE model to account for key asset
market statistics. The interval for ºl implies that the Frisch labor supply elasticity lies
between 0.3 and 1.3, re°ecting the micro-level estimates at the lower end, and the estimates
of Kimball and Shapiro (2003) and Chang and Kim (2005) at the upper end. According
to the prior for ³p, ¯rms re-optimize their prices, on average every 2.5 to 12.5 quarters.
This interval encompasses ¯ndings in micro-level studies of price adjustments such as Bils
and Klenow (2004). The prior for the adjustment cost parameter s00 is consistent with the
values that Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) report when matching consumption
and investment DSGE impulse response functions, among others, to VAR responses. Our
prior for a0 implies that in response to a 1% increase in the return to capital, utilization
rates rise by 0.1 to 0.3%. These numbers are considerably smaller than the one used by
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). Finally, the priors for ½z and ½g are centered
on 0.8. The priors for the standard deviation parameters are chosen to obtain realistic
magnitudes for the implied volatility of the output gap, in°ation, and interest rates. These
priors are by and large similar to the ones that have been used elsewhere in the literature,
e.g., Smets and Wouters (2003), Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2004), and23
Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2005).
We estimate the state-space representation of the DSGE model using the Bayesian
techniques described in Schorfheide (2000) and the DSGE-VARs with the Gibbs sampler
discussed in the Appendix for various values of ¸. Although ¸ is in principle a continuous
parameter, for computational reasons we consider only 8 values on a grid ranging from 0:25,
i.e., large prior variance of the misspeci¯cation matrices ª¢ and §¢, to 10, which implies
small misspeci¯cation. The DSGE-VAR analysis is based on p = 4 lags.
Table 2 summarizes the posterior of the hyperparameter ¸. Log marginal data densities
are reported in column 2 of the table. Di®erences of log marginal densities across ¸'s can
be interpreted as log posterior odds, under the assumption that the prior odds are equal to
one. The odds reported in the last column of Table 2 are relative to ¸ = 0:5, which is the
speci¯cation with the largest marginal data density and, according to this likelihood-based
criterion, the best ¯t. The posterior of ¸ has an inverted U-shape. There is little variation
in the marginal data densities for ¸ values between 0:5 and 1, whereas values outside of
this interval lead to a substantial deterioration in ¯t. In the ¯rst row of Table 2 we report
the marginal data density for the DSGE model, which is about 30 points lower than the
density of the DSGE-VAR(¸ = 0:5) on a log scale. We conclude that over the range of the
historical sample the DSGE model is strongly dominated by DSGE-VARs with fairly low
values of ¸, indicating that the structural model is to some extent misspeci¯ed and that its
policy predictions should be interpreted with care.8 However, the results of the next section
indicate that even when ¸ is as low as 0:5 much of the mechanics of the DSGE model carries
over to the DSGE-VAR. All DSGE-VAR results reported subsequently are based on ¸ = 0:5.
Parameter estimation results for the DSGE-VAR and the state-space representation
of the DSGE model are reported in Table 3. There is a growing literature highlighting
parameter identi¯cation problems associated with New Keynesian DSGE models, e.g. Beyer
and Farmer (2004), Canova and Sala (2005), and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004, 2005). In
some cases the rational expectations solution of the DSGE model implies that a subset of
structural parameters disappear from the reduced-form law of motion of the observables; in
other cases the estimation objective function may have little curvature in some directions.
Straightforward manipulations of Bayes Theorem can be used to show that priors are not
8The estimate of ¸ is in line with estimates that we obtained for DSGE-VARs ¯tted to output, in°ation,
and interest rate data based on a model without capital accumulation, see Del Negro and Schorfheide (2004,
2005), and a DSGE-VAR based on the Smets and Wouters (2003) model ¯tted to seven variables in Del
Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters (2004).24
updated in directions of the parameter space in which the likelihood function is °at, e.g.
Poirier (1998). Hence, to enable a careful comparison of priors and posteriors and an
assessment of the information extracted from the sample we also report means and con¯dence
intervals for the prior in Table 3. The summary statistics for the prior re°ect the truncation
at the boundary of the determinacy region. For the purpose of this study we are mostly
interested in the estimation of the degree of misspeci¯cation ¸ and of policy loss di®erentials.
With respect to ¸, lack of identi¯cation of the deep parameters is not a concern. Therefore,
we are concerned about lack of sample information only with respect to those parameters
that signi¯cantly a®ect the ranking of policies.
The policy parameter estimates obtained from the DSGE-VAR can be viewed as Bayesian
instrumental variable estimates. Since in°ation and the output gap are endogenous vari-
ables, the estimator of Ã1 and Ã2 has to be adjusted for the non-zero conditional expectation
of the monetary policy shock. Both the likelihood function associated with the state-space
representation of the DSGE model and the DSGE-VAR likelihood generate such an adjust-
ment. The former imposes all cross-coe±cient restrictions of the DSGE model, whereas the
latter relaxes the restrictions. The estimates of Ã1 are 2.19 for the DSGE-VAR and 1.90
for the DSGE model itself, implying a strong response of the Fed to in°ation in the post-
Volcker era. The estimated degree of interest rate smoothing is about 0.8. A comparison of
prior and posterior means for Ã2 indicates that the location shift is fairly small. The 90%
posterior probability interval is, however, much tighter than the prior interval, re°ecting the
information about the central bank's response to the output gap contained in the data. The
estimated interest-feedback rate rule is admittedly a stylized description of monetary policy
in the Volcker-Greenspan years. Yet the R2 of the policy rule equation, obtained using the
parameters that maximize the DSGE model posterior, is 94% for our sample period. This
number is not too far from the 97% percent obtained by Blinder and Reis (2005) for the
1987:Q3 to 2005:Q1 period using a more sophisticated rule. We have experimented with
a four-quarter moving average of in°ation as an argument of the rule. We found that this
does not a®ect the estimates of the other parameters, and slightly worsens the overall ¯t of
the model.
To understand the remaining parameter estimates obtained from the DSGE-VAR it is
instructive to consider the likelihood function, which is given by
p(Y jª;§;µ) (36)
/ j§j¡T=2etr
·
§¡1
µ
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We show in the Appendix that the mode of the posterior distribution of ª conditional on
§ and µ is of the form
~ ª(§;µ) = (¸T¡XX + X0X)¡1(¸T¡X ~ Y + X0 ~ Y )§¡1B0
2(B2§¡1B0
2)¡1;
where ~ Y (µ) = Y ¡ XB1(µ). Since we are unable to compute a marginal likelihood function
p(Y jµ) analytically, we consider the concentrated likelihood function instead p(Y j~ ª(§;µ);§;µ).
Notice that as ¸ approaches zero the non-policy parameters, which do not a®ect B1(µ) and
B2(µ) vanish from p(Y j~ ª(§;µ);§;µ) because ~ ª(§;µ) approaches (X0X)¡1X0 ~ Y §¡1B0
2(B2§¡1B0
2)¡1.
Hence, as the value of ¸ decreases we would expect the posterior distribution of the non-
policy parameters to resemble more closely the prior distribution. Indeed, we found this to
be the case.
The DSGE model estimates for the non-policy parameter point toward a large degree
of habit persistence, ^ h = 0:92, and a small elasticity of investment with respect to the value
of installed capital 1= ^ s00 = 0:12 implying fairly large capital adjustment costs. The estimate
of the Calvo parameter ³p is 0.59, indicating a fairly low degree of price-stickiness: Agents
re-optimize their prices on average every 2:5 quarters. We ¯nd that all shocks are fairly
persistent, but our autocorrelation estimates are not as large as in other studies, e.g. Smets
and Wouters (2003). The upper bound of the 90% posterior intervals for ½z and ½g are
well below 1. The likelihood function of the DSGE model provides little information on
g¤, and a0. While our values for g¤ can be justi¯ed by the historical government share,
the determination of a0 is more di±cult. We decided to conduct a robustness analysis by
comparing DSGE model-based loss di®erentials for various values of a0 and we found that
the losses and the ranking of policies were insensitive to this parameter.
For many parameters, the estimates obtained from the DSGE-VAR are by and large
similar to the the DSGE model estimates. One exception is the standard deviation of
demand shocks ¾g, which is much lower according to the DSGE-VAR. Other exceptions
are h and s00, for which the DSGE-VAR likelihood function contains little information. We
have compared the loss di®erentials under Scenario 1 for both the DSGE model and the
DSGE-VAR and found that the di®erences in the estimates of the deep parameters between
the two are quantitatively not important.
5.2 Policy Outcomes Under Misspeci¯cation
This section studies how policy outcomes change when misspeci¯cation is taken into account.
We analyze the e®ect of di®erent policies on aggregate stability under the four di®erent26
assumptions regarding misspeci¯cation described in Section 4.2. Speci¯cally, we evaluate
the variances of in°ation, interest rates, and the output gap under each scenario as a function
of all the parameters characterizing the interest rate rule (13): Ã1 and Ã2, the central
bank's response to in°ation and output, respectively, and ½R, the interest rate smoothing
parameter. Throughout this section we compute individual variances of the three series as
well as a weighted average for each point of a three-dimensional grid, where: Ã1 takes nine
values ranging from 1:001 to 3 in intervals of 0:25; Ã2 takes six di®erent values, computed
taking Taylor's (1993) value ÃT
2 = 0:125 as a reference, namely, 0, 1
2ÃT
2 = 0:062, ÃT
2 = 0:125,
3
2ÃT
2 = 0:188, 2ÃT
2 = 0:250, 3ÃT
2 = 0:375; and ½R takes three di®erent values, namely, 0:7,
0:8, and 0:95.9 Finally, we calculate variance di®erentials relative to the benchmark Ã1 = 2,
Ã2 = 0:188, ½R = 0:8, and take expectations. The benchmark is chosen by selecting the point
in the grid that roughly corresponds to the estimated values for those parameters, i.e., the
historical Volcker-Greenspan rule. Negative di®erentials therefore indicate an improvement,
that is, a reduction of variance, relative to the Volcker-Greenspan rule.
The results are summarized in Figures 2 and 3. Figure 2 contains four charts, one for
each scenario. Each chart shows three surfaces describing the posterior expected di®erentials
of the weighted variances as a function of Ã1 and Ã2. The three surfaces correspond to the
di®erent values for ½R (0:7, 0:8, and 0:95), with darkness of the surface being directly
proportional to ½R. In Figure 3 we decompose the weighted average of variance di®erentials
into the contributions of the three individual series for one particular slice of the three-
dimensional plot, obtained by ¯xing Ã2 to its benchmark value of 0:188.
Scenario 1 { Ignore Misspeci¯cation
The ¯rst of these scenarios amounts to evaluating policy as if the New Keynesian model
correctly described the data. This ¯rst scenario is the natural benchmark for comparing the
results obtained once we allow for the presence of misspeci¯cation. Although the model con-
sidered here has a number of additional rigidities relative to the stylized model considered in
Woodford (2003), the policy recommendation emerging from the analysis of the performance
di®erentials are in line with those in Woodford, at least qualitatively. First, a high response
of the interest rate to in°ation (high Ã1) is preferred to a low one, regardless of the value
taken by Ã2 and ½R. The drop in in°ation and interest rate variability is particularly steep
as Ã1 increases from 1:001 to 1:5, but °attens thereafter, as can be appreciated from the
two-dimensional plot in Figure 3. The mechanism underlying this result is well known: due
9We have experimented with a ¯ner grid, especially for Ã1 and ½R, and we have found the loss to be a
smooth function of these parameters. Hence, for ease of exposition we focus on the coarser grid.27
to the forward looking nature of the model an increase in Ã1 results in a drop of in°ation
variability, which in turn implies { for given ½R { a lower volatility of interest rates.
The top panel of Figure 4, which shows the impulse responses for the DSGE model as
a function of Ã1, illustrates this mechanism. The panel displays the impulse responses with
respect to the technology shock ²z;t and the demand shock ²g;t for three di®erent values
of Ã1, 1:25, 2, and 2:75, keeping Ã2 and ½R at their historical values. Recall that these
shocks are the only ones that matter for the variance calculations, since we set ¾R = 0 and
exclude the monetary policy shocks. The ¯gure shows that the response of in°ation and
the interest rate to both shocks is less strong the higher the value of Ã1. Quantitatively,
it is the response to technology shocks that makes the di®erence, with in°ation responding
roughly twice as strongly for Ã1 equal to 1:25 than for Ã1 equal to 2:75. The response of
interest rates to both shocks is slightly stronger on impact the higher the value of Ã1, but
becomes weaker soon thanks to the fact that in°ation is kept under control. The output
gap is more volatile for high Ã1 with respect to technology shocks, but quantitatively the
di®erence is not large. With respect to demand shocks the response of the output gap is
strong on impact, but is not a®ected by the size of Ã1.
The expected variance di®erential as a function of ½R depends on the values of Ã1 and
Ã2, as shown in Figure 2. For low values of Ã1 and high values of Ã2, a higher interest
rate inertia is preferred. As the value of Ã2 decreases and, especially, that of Ã1 increases,
the expected loss di®erential as a function of ½R becomes °atter. For values of Ã1 larger
than 1.25 the optimal value of ½R is 0.8. The individual variance di®erentials depicted in
Figure 3 as well as the impulse responses for the DSGE model as a function of ½R, shown
in the top panel of Figure 5, provide further insights. A value of ½R equal to 0:95 implies a
drastic reduction in the variability of interest rates relative to the baseline ½R = 0:8, but a
slightly increased variability of in°ation. Given the weights that we used in our calculation
of average variance di®erentials plotted in Figure 2, this trade-o® is resolved by choosing a
value of ½R that is neither too high (here, 0:95) nor too low (0:7). It is clear, however, that
the outcome depends on the speci¯c choice of the weights.
Figure 2 shows that the weighted variances as a function of Ã2 are sharply increasing for
low values of Ã1 and ½R: Targeting the output gap in the presence of a weak interest rate
response to in°ation results in high in°ation and interest rate variability. The slope of our
performance measure with respect to Ã2 decreases as ½R, but especially Ã1, increase. For
high values of Ã1 the expected loss di®erential appears from Figure 2 almost invariant with
respect to Ã2. In fact, it is slightly U-shaped, with a minimum for the historical value of28
Ã2 = 0:188. According to our weighting scheme the variability of the endogenous variables
is minimized, ignoring misspeci¯cation, if Ã1 = 3:00 (the highest value in the grid), while
Ã2 and ½R equal their estimated values of 0:188 and 0:8, respectively. The inference about
the misspeci¯cation parameter ¸ in Table 2 casts some doubts on the reliability of DSGE
model predictions, however. Hence we move to take potential misspeci¯cation into account.
Scenario 2 { Acknowledge Misspeci¯cation, Discard the Past
In Scenario 2 the policymaker still uses the DSGE model to compute the mean response
of the endogenous variables to the change in the policy parameters but recognizes that
\nature" may be injecting noise around these mean responses using the prior distribution.
Under this scenario the policymaker learns from the data about the overall amount of noise
(¸) but refuses to learn about the precise nature of the misspeci¯cation. We therefore refer
to this scenario as \Acknowledge Misspeci¯cation { Discard the Past," where \Discard the
Past" refers to the fact that under this scenario the policymaker refuses to use the posterior
information regarding ª¢ and §¢ on the grounds that it contains no useful information
once policy changes. Rather, she uses the prior distribution to generate draws of ª¢ and §¢
in evaluating policy outcomes. In both Figures 2 and 3 we focus on the expected variance
di®erentials computed for ¸ = 0:5, which represents the \best-¯tting" model. We have
computed our measures of aggregate stability for the entire sequence of ¸ values included
in Table 2 and have found that the policy outcomes for intermediate values of ¸ conform
with our expectations. That is, the results are pretty similar to those for the DSGE model
when ¸ equals 5 or 10, and as ¸ decreases they become more similar to those obtained for
¸ = 0:5. Moreover, we ¯nd that for ¸ values between 0:5 and 1 { that is, for all the models
that would receive non-negligible weights in a Bayesian posterior averaging calculation { the
variance di®erentials are both qualitatively and quantitatively very similar. Therefore we
focus on ¸ = 0:5.
Under Scenario 2 the qualitative policy implications obtained under the DSGE model
remain valid. Figure 2 shows that a strong response of the interest rate to in°ation move-
ments is preferred. Moreover, for high enough Ã1 the best choice of ½R equals the historical
value of 0:8. Unlike in Scenario 1 we ¯nd that under Scenario 2 the policymaker should
not respond at all to the output gap if performance is measured by the weighted average of
variances. Indeed, the best performing policy according to this measure under Scenario 2
is identical to that under Scenario 1, except that Ã2 equals 0. Quantitatively, the expected29
variance di®erentials also appear very similar under Scenarios 1 and 2.10 Under Scenario 2
(as under the prior) the misspeci¯cation matrices ª¢ and §¢ have zero mean. Because of
non-linearities in the impulse-response functions, the zero mean in the misspeci¯cation ma-
trices does not imply that the expected variance di®erentials are the same with and without
misspeci¯cation. But in our application they are roughly the same. This does not imply
that introducing misspeci¯cation under Scenario 2 bears no consequences for the policy-
maker. The impact of misspeci¯cation can be felt in the uncertainty surrounding a given
policy outcome. This uncertainty averages out in Figures 2 and 3 but can play a substantial
role in a risk-sensitive analysis. We will return to this point later.
Scenario 3 { Learn About Misspeci¯cation (Policy Invariant)
In Scenario 3 the policymaker uses sample information to learn about the precise nature of
misspeci¯cation, unlike in the previous scenario. In addition, she believes that the histor-
ically observed discrepancies ª¢ and §¢ are policy invariant. Figure 2 shows that under
this scenario the variance surface is quite di®erent than under Scenarios 1 and 2. First of
all, there is much more curvature with respect to Ã2. Second, the variance pro¯le is no
longer strictly decreasing in Ã1, at least for values of ½R less than 0:95, as can be seen from
Figure 3. For small ½Rs the loss di®erential is a U-shaped function of Ã1, with the minimum
attained at the value of 1:5 for ½R = 0:8.
The contours of the variance di®erentials under Scenario 3 are almost exclusively driven
by the presence of explosive roots, at least for values of ½R less than 0:95. Explosiveness
is not a concern at all for Scenarios 1 (mechanically), and 2 (as is non-uniqueness of the
rational expectation equilibrium). For Scenario 4 the fraction of explosive draws is very
small. For Scenario 3 explosiveness is ubiquitous. Hence, the policy recommendation under
Scenario 3 is largely driven by the desire to avoid explosiveness.
We view this policy recommendation with suspicion, because it results from ignoring
the correlation between the policy parameters and the size of misspeci¯cation in models
that have a backward-looking component. We now elaborate on this point for the case of
10This is a bit misleading, however, as the underlying draw of the deep parameters µ is di®erent under the
two scenarios { one corresponds to the DSGE model and the other to DSGE-VAR (the values are given in
Table 3). Whenever we computed the loss under Scenario 1 using the DSGE-VAR draws for µ, we ¯nd that
the shape of the loss functions is exactly the same, but the expected loss di®erentials are smaller, largely
because the estimated standard deviation of demand shocks is smaller. When we use the same set of draws
for the deep parameters under both scenarios, we see that allowing for misspeci¯cation actually enhances
the loss di®erentials, particularly those associated with small values of Ã1. Quantitatively, the di®erence is
not very large.30
DSGE-VAR. Recall that the estimated VAR parameters ^ ª can be decomposed into the sum
of the parameters implied by the DSGE restrictions ª¤(µ) and of the misspeci¯cation ª¢.
Roughly speaking, under Scenario 3, the new set of VAR parameters is computed as the sum
of ª¤(~ µ), which changes with policy, and ª¢, which is assumed to be invariant. If the policy
parameters are close to estimated ones, the sum of ª¤(~ µ) and ª¢ returns the estimated VAR
parameters, which do not have explosive roots. But as we move away from the estimated
policy parameters, or as we ignore the correlation between the policy parameters and ª¢,
the sum of ª¤(~ µ) and ª¢ can deliver new VAR parameters whose roots are explosive.
Here, this is particularly true for low values of ½R.11 Inserting a policy rule di®erent from
the estimated one into a backward-looking model can often produce explosiveness.12 This
explosiveness is driven by the fact that the backward looking component of the system
(here, ª¢) is not allowed to change with policy. Here, for instance, we ¯nd that a number
of policies that are not too di®erent from the historical one (say, Ã1 between 1:75 and 2:5,
Ã2 = 0:188, and ½R = 0:8) deliver a non-negligible probability of explosiveness. We see this
as a warning against having the backward-looking component of the model invariant with
policy, rather than a warning against these policies.
Scenario 4 { Learn About Misspeci¯cation (Conditional)
Scenario 4 is an attempt to address this concern. Under this scenario the policymaker again
uses sample information to learn about potential model misspeci¯cation. As in Scenario 3,
the misspeci¯cation is backward looking. But unlike in Scenario 3, the policymaker takes
into account the in-sample correlation between the policy parameters and the misspeci¯-
cation matrices ª¢ and §¢. Speci¯cally, the policymaker now asks the question: What
would the estimates of the discrepancies ª¢ and §¢ be if the new policy had been in place
during the sample period? Explosiveness is no longer an overriding concern in Scenario 4,
as it was in Scenario 3. The reason for this result is that now as ~ µ changes both ª¤(~ µ) and
ª¢(~ µ) change in such a way that the sum of the two is not too di®erent from the estimated
VAR parameters. Indeed, for ¸ close to zero the dynamics for all equations other than the
interest rate rule are approximately independent of the policy parameters.
11Whenever ¸ is large, however, ª¢ is negligible and the new VAR parameters roughly coincide with
ª¤(~ µ), which is non-explosive.
12There are several examples in the literature. For instance, Levin and Williams (2003) ¯nd that many of
the rules they consider generate explosiveness in the backward-looking Rudebusch-Svenson model. Likewise,
Cogley and Sargent (2005) ¯nd that the optimal policy computed under their rational expectations \Lucas"
model leads to explosive behavior when plugged into the backward-looking \Solow-Samuelson" model.31
Figure 2 shows that under Scenario 4 the variance pro¯le becomes °atter. In particular,
the drop in in°ation variability that characterized the increase in Ã1 from 1:001 to 1:5 under
the DSGE model is much smaller under Scenario 4, as can be appreciated from Figure 3.
Under the DSGE model the mechanics of the rational expectations equilibrium imply that
high values of Ã1 help to anchor in°ationary expectations. Since in equilibrium in°ation
moves less than under high values of Ã1, interest rates need to move less as well. The
presence of substantial misspeci¯cation changes these dynamic responses, as shown in the
bottom panel of Figure 4. As Ã1 increases the response of in°ation to both technology
and demand shocks is more subdued, as in the DSGE model. Unlike in the DSGE model,
the interest rate becomes more volatile as Ã1 increases, not only on impact but also in the
medium run. Figure 3 indeed con¯rms that interest rate variability rises as the central bank
responds more strongly to in°ation. Moreover, compared to Scenario 1 the increase in the
output gap volatility is ampli¯ed. If the policymaker cared only about in°ation, she would
still choose a high response to in°ation even under misspeci¯cation. However, if interest
rate and output gap variability are also a concern, a large value of Ã1 is undesirable. Indeed,
if performance is measured by our weighted average of variances, the preferred value of Ã1
is 1.75.
The presence of misspeci¯cation also a®ects the policy prescription with respect to the
degree of inertia ½R. Figure 5 shows that under the DSGE model high interest rate inertia
leads to slightly higher in°ation variability, but quantitatively the e®ect is small. This is
because in the DSGE model agents are aware that the eventual increase in interest rates
following a sustained increase in in°ation would be large, even if today's response is small.
Under misspeci¯cation, this mechanism does not come into play: The milder response of
interest rates to shocks under high inertia leads to a substantial increase in the volatility of
in°ation. Finally, Scenario 4 shares with Scenario 2 an aversion against high responses to
the output gap. Indeed, the best performing policy under Scenario 4 is Ã1 = 1:75, Ã2 = 0:06
and ½R = 0:8.
The results in Figures 2 and 3 depend on the somewhat arbitrary choice of the bound.
For this reason, we have recomputed all ¯gures using a bound that is double (100) or ten
times larger (500) than the one used so far. Although the variance di®erentials that are
a®ected by explosive behavior, particularly in Scenario 3, change substantially with the
bound, we ¯nd that the overall shape of the contours, and hence the gist of our conclusions,
stay roughly the same.32
Risk-Sensitive Analysis
Finally, Figure 6 compares the variance di®erentials that we just analyzed with those ob-
tained under the risk-sensitive version of our problem. We focus in particular on Scenario 2,
which is the closest in spirit to the robustness literature, but we also show the benchmark,
Scenario 1. For both scenarios the ¯gure shows the risk-sensitive loss (black) as well as
the risk-neutral loss (light grey).13 For Scenario 1, where the risk-sensitivity is only with
respect to the deep parameters µs, we ¯nd that the risk-sensitive loss is generally not too
di®erent from the plain-vanilla one. The only di®erence is quantitative: The loss stemming
from a weak response to in°ation is much larger under the risk-sensitive calculations. In
Scenario 2, risk-sensitivity would induce the policymaker to avoid not only low values of Ã1,
but also high values of Ã2 as long as Ã1 is not above 2. Recall that misspeci¯cation alone
had little e®ect on the expected loss di®erential in Scenario 2. However, when combined
with a concern for robustness, it leads to a starker recommendation relative to the DSGE
model: Avoid the combination of moderate interest rate responses to in°ation and strong
responses to the output gap.
Performance of Alternative Rules
In Table 4 we report the implications in terms of interest rate, in°ation, and output gap
volatility for the best performing rule under each scenario, as well as for a set of alternative
policy rules that have been considered in the literature. The best performing rules under each
scenario are computed according to the summary measure de¯ned in Section 4 and reported
in the last 3 rows of the table. The remaining rules include four of the ¯ve benchmark policy
rules described in Table 1 of John Taylor's (1999) volume. Taylor I and II are interest rate
smoothing rules with a coe±cient ½R = 1. These rules were favored in the simulations by
Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999), who studied the performance of interest-rate rules in
four di®erent structural macroeconometric models of the U.S. economy: the Federal Reserve
Board sta® model, the Monetary Studies Research model, the Fuhrer-Moore model, and
Taylor's multi-country model. In our DSGE model ½R = 1 rules make interest rates non-
stationary and the calculation of the model-based autocovariance matrices that is needed
for the construction of the prior distribution would have to be adjusted. We decided to
replace the coe±cient of unity by ½R = 0:95.14 Taylor III is Taylor's (1993) rule, which
13A caveat of our analysis so far is that we do not distinguish between uncertainty in the deep parameters
µ and in the misspeci¯cation parameters ª¢ and §¢. In principle we want to be robust against the latter,
but not necessarily the former.
14Equation (19) provides the basis for the conversion of policy rule coe±cients into our setup. The interest
rate and output gap coe±cients are converted according to Ã1 = g¼=0:05 and Ã2 = gy=(4 ¢ 0:05).33
does not entail interest rate smoothing. Taylor IV rule is the same as Taylor III except
that the central bank responds twice as strongly to the output gap. The ¯fth rule in Taylor
(1999) is a super-inertia rule (½R = 1:3), which we omit from our analysis. The last two
rules considered in Table 4 correspond to the robust Bayesian and minimax rules reported
in Levin and Williams (2003).15 Levin and Williams' (2003) calculation of robust rules
is based on three models: a New Keynesian DSGE model, the Rudebusch-Svenson (1999)
model, and Fuhrer's (2000) habit persistence model.
The ¯rst panel of Table 4 displays for each policy the coe±cients Ã1, Ã2, and ½R. The
next three panels show the implication in terms of volatility for the interest rate, in°ation,
and the output gap, respectively, for the ten di®erent policies we consider. For each panel
we report the change in the volatility of the relevant variable relative to the baseline rule,
computed under Scenarios 1, 2, and 4. We omit Scenario 3 from the Table 4. The analysis
conducted under this scenario is not particularly interesting for the reasons discussed before:
The presence of explosive draws is driving the results for most of the rules.
The best-performing rule under the DSGE model (rule 1) not surprisingly leads to good
outcomes for all the variables under Scenarios 1 and 2. But under Scenario 4, rules that are
less sensitive to the output gap, such as rule 2 for instance, are preferred. The high inertia
of rule 3, combined with a non-negligible value of Ã2, also leads to high volatility for all
variables under Scenario 4. Rule 4, which displays a more moderate response to in°ation,
performs slightly worse than the baseline in terms of in°ation if the DSGE model is correct.
Under misspeci¯cation, however, it performs well for all variables. The rules Taylor I and
Taylor II perform very well under Scenarios 1 and 2 since they imply a strong response to
in°ation movements. In fact, the Taylor I rule reduces in°ation volatility more than our
preferred rules for Scenarios 1 and 2, because we restrict the value of Ã1 to be less than 3 in
our calculations. Quantitatively the di®erence is not large, however. Because of their high
output sensitivity, these rules lead to increased variability in the output gap relative to the
baseline under Scenario 4. Based on our previous discussion it is not surprising that the
non-inertial (½R = 0) rules Taylor III and Taylor IV perform poorly across all four scenarios.
Levin and Williams' (2003) robust rules also perform well under Scenarios 1 and 2. This
may stem from the fact that the authors included a New Keynesian DSGE model in their
analysis of monetary policy rules. However, Rules 5 and 6 are dominated by Taylor I across
all scenarios. Both of the Levin-Williams rules display high output gap sensitivity and hence
15Taken from the ¸ = 0:5 and Á = 0:1 entry in Tables 4 and 7 of Levin and Williams (2003) and converted
according to Ã1 = 1 + ®=(1 ¡ ½) and Ã2 = ¯=(4 ¢ (1 ¡ ½)).34
perform somewhat poorly in the \learn about misspeci¯cation" scenarios compared to the
baseline. This is the case for all three variables.
In summary, the qualitative implications of our ¯ndings are as follows: (i) Policies that
mainly aim at clamping down on in°ation actually succeed in reducing in°ation variability,
even in the presence of misspeci¯cation. Misspeci¯cation, however, implies that the cost of
these policies in terms of interest rate variability is higher than under the DSGE model.
(ii) Policies that also respond to the output gap lead to comparable (and sometimes slightly
better) outcomes if the DSGE model is correct. However, these policies lead to worse
outcomes under Scenario 4, not only in terms of in°ation but also of output variability.
(iii) Non-inertial policies lead to a high degree of interest rate volatility under all scenarios.
Policies that are extremely inertial (½R = 0:95) lead to worse outcomes in terms of in°ation
under Scenario 4. Quantitatively we ¯nd that the risks and the gains associated with
deviating from the historical Volcker-Greenspan policy are sensitive to the misspeci¯cation
assumptions considered. For instance, when the policymaker chooses to learn from the
historical data about misspeci¯cation (Scenario 4), she ¯nds that the increase in in°ation
volatility associated with policies that deviate from the DSGE model prescriptions is not as
large as policy analysis under the DSGE model would suggest. In the end, a fairly robust
policy recommendation emerges from our analysis: the central bank should avoid strong
responses to output gap movements and not react weakly to in°ation °uctuations. Also, we
¯nd that the gains associated with deviating from the historical Volcker-Greenspan policy,
whenever positive, are generally not very large. This suggests that the historical rule, if
not always optimal among those we consider, has been reasonably good at least from the
perspective of this sticky-prices DSGE model, even taking misspeci¯cation into account.
6 Conclusion
Encouraged by the work of Smets and Wouters (2003) many central banks are in the process
of developing and estimating DSGE models usable for quantitative monetary policy analy-
sis. The empirical results in this paper and in Del Negro, Schorfheide, Smets, and Wouters
(2004) document that model misspeci¯cation remains a concern as less restrictive vector au-
toregressive speci¯cations attain a better time-series ¯t than the DSGE model itself. In this
paper we developed and applied techniques to conduct quantitative monetary policy analysis
with DSGE models while explicitly taking account of their potential misspeci¯cation.35
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A Implementation of the Posterior Simulation
A.1 Draws from the Posterior
We adopt the notation that ~ Y (µ) = Y ¡ XB1(µ), which leads to the de¯nitions
¡~ Y ~ Y = ¡Y Y ¡ ¡Y XB1(µ) ¡ B1(µ)0¡XY ¡ B1(µ)0¡XXB1(µ); ¡X ~ Y = ¡XY ¡ ¡XXB1(µ):
Let etr[A] = exp[¡1
2tr[A]]. The likelihood function for the VAR representation is given by
p(Y jª;§;µ) (A.1)
/ j§j¡T=2etr
·
§¡1
µ
Y ¡ X(B1(µ) + ªB2(µ))
¶0µ
Y ¡ X(B1(µ) + ªB2(µ))
¶¸
:
Using Lemma 1(i) we can rewrite the prior mean of ª as
ª¤(µ) = ¹ ª(§;µ) = ¡
¡1
XX(µ)¡X ~ Y (µ)§¡1B0
2(µ)[B2(µ)§¡1B0
2(µ)]¡1:
The prior density for ª conditional on § is of the form
p(ªj§;µ) / etr
·
§¡1¸T
µ
¡ 2B0
2ª0¡X ~ Y (µ) + B0
2ª0¡XX(µ)ªB2
¶¸
: (A.2)
The prior density for § is given by
p(§jµ) / j§j¡ 1
2(¸T¡k+n+1)etr
·
§¡1¸T§¤(µ))
¸
(A.3)
To simplify notation the (µ)-argument of the functions B1, B2, ~ Y , ¡XY , ¡XX, and ¡Y Y is
omitted.
Conditional Posterior of ª: Combining the prior density (A.2) with the likelihood func-
tion (A.1) yields
p(ªj§;µ;Y )
/ p(Y jª;§;µ)p(ªj§;µ) (A.4)
/ etr
·
§¡1¸T
µ
¡Y Y ¡ 2B0
2ª0¡X ~ Y + B0
2ª0¡XX(µ)ªB2
¶
+ (~ Y ¡ XªB2)0(~ Y ¡ XªB2)
¸
/ etr
·
§¡1
µ
¡ 2B0
2ª0(¸T¡X ~ Y + X0 ~ Y ) + B0
2ª0(¸T¡XX + X0X)ªB2
¶¸39
De¯ne
~ ª(§;µ) = (¸T¡XX + X0X)¡1(¸T¡X ~ Y + X0 ~ Y )§¡1B0
2(B2§¡1B0
2)¡1:
The previous calculations show that
ªj§;µ;Y » N
µ
~ ª(§;µ);
·
(B2§¡1B0
2) ­ (¸T¡XX + X0X)
¸¡1¶
: (A.5)
Conditional Posterior of §: Combining the prior densities (A.2) and (A.3) with the
likelihood function (A.1) yields
p(§jª;µ;Y ) / p(Y jª;§;µ)p(ªj§;µ)p(§jµ) (A.6)
/ j§j¡ 1
2((¸+1)T¡k+n+1)j(B2§¡1B0
2)¡1j¡ k
2
etr
·
§¡1
µ
¸T(¡~ Y ~ Y ¡ ¡~ Y X¡
¡1
XX¡X ~ Y ) + (~ Y ¡ XªB2)0(~ Y ¡ XªB2)
¶
+¸T(B2§¡1B0
2)(ª ¡ ¹ ª)0¡XX(ª ¡ ¹ ª)
¸
:
Using the de¯nition of ¹ ª, the last term can be manipulated as follows:
etr
·
¸TB2§¡1B0
2(ª ¡ ¹ ª)0¡XX(ª ¡ ¹ ª)
¸
= etr
·
¸T§¡1
µ
B0
2ª0¡XXªB2 ¡ 2B0
2ª0¡X ~ Y
¶
+¸T§¡1B0
2(B2§¡1B0
2)¡1B2§¡1¡0
X ~ Y ¡
¡1
XX¡X ~ Y
¸
Hence,
p(§jª;µ;Y ) / j§j¡ 1
2((¸+1)T¡k+n+1)j(B2§¡1B0
2)¡1j¡ k
2 (A.7)
£ etr
·
§¡1
µ
¸T¡~ Y ~ Y + ~ Y 0 ~ Y ¡ 2B0
2ª0(¸T¡X ~ Y + X0 ~ Y )
+B0
2ª0(¸T¡XX + X0X)ªB2
¶¸
£ etr
·
¸T(§¡1B0
2(B2§¡1B0
2)¡1B2§¡1 ¡ §¡1)¡0
X ~ Y ¡
¡1
XX¡X ~ Y
¸
:
If the DSGE model satis¯es Equation (20) and the error u1;t is orthogonal to xt then
¡X ~ Y = ¡XXª0(µ)B2
and
(§¡1B0
2(B2§¡1B0
2)¡1B2§¡1 ¡ §¡1)¡0
X ~ Y ¡
¡1
XX¡X ~ Y = 0: (A.8)
While the conditional posterior distribution of § given our prior distribution is not of
the IW form, use an IW distribution as proposal distribution in a Metropolis-Hastings40
step. De¯ne
~ S(ª;µ) = ¸T¡~ Y ~ Y + ~ Y 0 ~ Y ¡ (¸T¡X ~ Y + X0 ~ Y )0ªB2 ¡ B0
2ª0(¸T¡X ~ Y + X0 ~ Y ) (A.9)
+B0
2ª0(¸T¡XX + X0X)ªB2
Our proposal distribution for § is
IW(~ S(ª;µ);(¸ + 1)T;n):
Conditional Posterior of µ: The posterior distribution of µ is irregular. Its density is
proportional to the joint density of Y , ª, §, and µ, which we can evaluate numerically since
the normalization constants for p(ªj§;µ) and p(§jµ) are readily available.
p(µjª;§;Y ) / p(Y;ª;§;µ) = p(Y jª;§;µ)p(ªj§;µ)p(§jµ)p(µ): (A.10)
To obtain a proposal density for p(µjª;§;Y ) we (i) maximize the posterior density of the
DSGE model with respect to µ and (ii) calculate the inverse Hessian at the mode, denoted
by V¹ µ;DSGE. (iii) We then use a random-walk Metropolis step with proposal density
N(µ(s¡1);cV¹ µ;DSGE)
where µ(s¡1) is the value of µ drawn in iteration s ¡ 1 of the MCMC algorithm, and c is a
scaling factor that can be used to control the rejection rate in the Metropolis step.41
Table 1: Prior Distribution
Name Domain Density P(1) P(2)
Ã1 I R
+ Gamma 1.500 0.400
Ã2 I R
+ Gamma 0.200 0.100
½R [0;1) Beta 0.500 0.200
r¤
a I R
+ Gamma 1.000 0.400
¼¤
a I R Normal 3.000 2.000
g¤ I R
+ Beta 0.150 0.050
h [0;1) Beta 0.700 0.100
ºl I R
+ Gamma 2.000 0.750
³p [0;1) Beta 0.750 0.100
s0 I R
+ Gamma 4.000 1.500
a00 I R
+ Gamma 0.200 0.075
½z [0;1) Beta 0.800 0.050
½g [0;1) Beta 0.800 0.050
¾z I R
+ InvGamma 0.400 2.000
¾g I R
+ InvGamma 0.300 2.000
¾R I R
+ InvGamma 0.200 2.000
Notes: P(1) and P(2) list the means and the standard deviations for Beta, Gamma, and
Normal distributions; the upper and lower bound of the support for the Uniform distribution;
s and º for the Inverse Gamma distribution, where pIG(¾jº;s) / ¾¡º¡1e¡ºs
2=2¾
2
. See
Section 2 for a de¯nition of the DSGE model's parameters. We are reporting annualized
values for ¼¤ and r¤ (a-subscript). The following parameters were ¯xed: ® = 0:25, ± = 0:025,
° = 1:5, ¸f = 0:3. The e®ective prior is truncated at the boundary of the determinacy
region.42
Table 2: Log Marginal Data Densities and Posterior Odds
Speci¯cation lnp(Y ) Post Odds
DSGE Model -305.44 5E-13
DSGE-VAR, ¸ = 10:0 -297.16 2E-09
DSGE-VAR, ¸ = 5:0 -291.28 7E-07
DSGE-VAR, ¸ = 2:0 -283.70 0.001
DSGE-VAR, ¸ = 1:5 -281.23 0.017
DSGE-VAR, ¸ = 1:0 -278.46 0.278
DSGE-VAR, ¸ = 0:75 -277.22 0.968
DSGE-VAR, ¸ = 0:50 -277.18 1.000
DSGE-VAR, ¸ = 0:25 -283.34 0.002
Notes: The marginal data densities are obtained by integrating the likelihood function with
respect to the model parameters, weighted by the prior density conditional on ¸. The
di®erence of log marginal data densities can be interpreted as log posterior odds under the
assumption that the two speci¯cations have equal prior probabilities.43
Table 3: Parameter Estimation Results
Prior Posterior
DSGE-VAR (¸ = 0:5) DSGE (State Sp)
Mean 90% Interval Mean 90% Interval Mean 90% Interval
Ã1 1.56 [ 1.00 , 2.07 ] 2.19 [ 1.68 , 2.71 ] 1.90 [ 1.43 , 2.37 ]
Ã2 0.20 [ 0.05 , 0.35 ] 0.15 [ 0.07 , 0.23 ] 0.18 [ 0.11 , 0.26 ]
½R 0.50 [ 0.18 , 0.83 ] 0.83 [ 0.79 , 0.88 ] 0.80 [ 0.75 , 0.85 ]
r¤
a 1.00 [ 0.37 , 1.61 ] 0.86 [ 0.36 , 1.34 ] 0.88 [ 0.47 , 1.27 ]
¼¤
a 3.00 [ -0.31 , 6.26 ] 3.10 [ 2.46 , 3.71 ] 3.02 [ 2.44 , 3.59 ]
g¤ 0.15 [ 0.07 , 0.23 ] 0.15 [ 0.07 , 0.23 ] 0.13 [ 0.06 , 0.20 ]
h 0.70 [ 0.54 , 0.86 ] 0.73 [ 0.59 , 0.89 ] 0.92 [ 0.87 , 0.96 ]
ºl 2.00 [ 0.78 , 3.12 ] 1.55 [ 0.72 , 2.35 ] 1.19 [ 0.76 , 1.60 ]
³p 0.75 [ 0.59 , 0.92 ] 0.66 [ 0.54 , 0.78 ] 0.59 [ 0.46 , 0.71 ]
s00 4.00 [ 1.61 , 6.30 ] 4.39 [ 1.95 , 6.77 ] 8.15 [ 5.09 , 11.15 ]
a0 0.20 [ 0.08 , 0.32 ] 0.22 [ 0.10 , 0.34 ] 0.23 [ 0.11 , 0.35 ]
½z 0.80 [ 0.72 , 0.88 ] 0.83 [ 0.76 , 0.90 ] 0.83 [ 0.78 , 0.88 ]
½g 0.80 [ 0.72 , 0.88 ] 0.83 [ 0.75 , 0.90 ] 0.89 [ 0.86 , 0.93 ]
¾z 0.71 [ 0.16 , 1.24 ] 0.83 [ 0.47 , 1.18 ] 0.85 [ 0.59 , 1.09 ]
¾g 0.53 [ 0.12 , 0.93 ] 0.37 [ 0.27 , 0.47 ] 0.66 [ 0.56 , 0.76 ]
¾R 0.36 [ 0.08 , 0.63 ] 0.13 [ 0.10 , 0.16 ] 0.16 [ 0.13 , 0.18 ]44
Table 4: Comparative Performance of Selected Policy Rules
Preferred in Scenario Taylor (1999) Levin-Williams
1 2 3 4 I II III IV Bayes Minimax
Parameters
Ã1 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.75 60.00 24.00 1.50 1.50 4.20 6.50
Ã2 0.19 0.00 0.19 0.06 4.00 5.00 0.125 0.25 0.80 1.375
½R 0.80 0.80 0.95 0.80 0.95 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.80
Interest Rate Variance
Scenario: 1 0.13 0.03 -1.38 -0.23 1.02 0.50 9.48 10.31 3.42 1.20
2 0.07 -0.34 -1.16 -0.48 1.79 1.56 8.31 11.13 5.89 2.49
4 2.53 0.49 3.80 -2.76 1.50 5.91 3.56 6.43 5.55 6.19
In°ation Variance
Scenario: 1 -0.80 -0.66 0.39 0.42 -1.61 -0.92 2.85 3.44 -0.86 -0.81
2 -0.89 -1.12 -0.12 -0.23 -1.79 -1.01 2.73 4.77 -0.54 -0.70
4 0.04 -0.78 4.76 -0.67 -0.16 6.75 1.66 3.71 3.92 6.18
Output Gap Variance
Scenario: 1 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.04 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08
2 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.03 -0.11 -0.18 -0.01 0.01
4 1.16 -0.76 3.45 -1.68 3.10 6.98 0.57 2.37 4.51 6.48
Weighted Variances
Scenario: 1 -0.77 -0.64 0.05 0.37 -1.36 -0.81 5.21 6.00 -0.02 -0.53
2 -0.86 -1.17 -0.40 -0.34 -1.31 -0.61 4.78 7.50 0.93 0.07
4 0.62 -0.72 4.79 -1.46 0.35 6.85 2.51 5.10 4.64 6.54
Notes: Posterior expected variance di®erentials as a function of Ã1 and Ã2 relative to
baseline policy rule Ã1 = 2:0, Ã2 = 0:188, ½R = 0:80. Negative di®erentials signify a
variance reduction relative to baseline rule.45
Figure 1: Stylized View of DSGE Model Misspecification
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Notes: Φ = [φ1,φ2]0 can be interpreted as the VAR parameters, and Φ∗(θ) is the restriction
function implied by the DSGE model.46
Figure 2: Comparative Performance of Different Rules: Summary Measure
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Notes: Posterior expected variance diﬀerentials as a function of ψ1 and ψ2 relative to
baseline policy rule ψ1 = 2.0, ψ2 = 0.188, ρR = 0.80. The weighted variances under
the baseline policy rule for the four scenarios are 2.46, 2.54, 20.13, and 4.77 respectively.
Negative diﬀerentials signify a variance reduction relative to baseline rule. Surfaces’ color
ranges from very light grey (ρ = 0.7) to dark grey (ρ = 0.95), with the darkness of the
surface being directly proportional to ρ.47
Figure 3: Comparative Performance of Different Rules: Individual Variables
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1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3
−5
0
5
10
y
1
Interest Rate
1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3
0
5
10
15
y
1
Inflation
1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8 3
−2
0
2
4
y
1
Output Gap
Notes: Posterior expected variance diﬀerentials as a function of ψ1 and ψ2 relative to
baseline policy rule ψ1 = 2.0, ψ2 = 0.188, ρR = 0.80. Negative diﬀerentials signify a variance
reduction relative to baseline rule. Lines’ color ranges from very light grey (ψ1 = 1.25) to
dark grey (ψ1 = 2.75), with the darkness of the line being directly proportional to ψ1.48
Figure 4: Impulse Responses as Function of ψ1
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses as Function of ρR
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Notes: Lines’ color ranges from very light grey (ρR = .7) to dark grey (ρR = .95), with the
darkness of the line being directly proportional to ρR.50
Figure 6: Expected Policy Loss Differentials - Risk-Neutral versus Risk-
Sensitive
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Notes: Policy loss diﬀerentials relative to baseline policy rule ψ1 = 2.0, ψ2 = 1.88, ρR = 0.80.
All numbers are computed ﬁxing the value of ρR = 0.8. Negative diﬀerentials signify an
improvement relative to baseline rule. For each scenario, the expected loss diﬀerential is
shown in light grey, and the risk-sensitive loss diﬀerential in black.